This paper employs mean-variance and mean-skewness optimization to investigate farmers' crop choices under Gross Revenue Insurance (GRIP), Whole Farm Income Insurance, the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization program, and its modified 2008 program AgrInvest. To our knowledge this paper is the first to fully consider the endogenous optimization of whole farm insurance in a farm optimization model. The results indicate that farmers will alter farm plans significantly in response to the type of insurance offered and the level of subsidy. Farmers will take on production risks that they would not otherwise take and this risk taking behavior is exacerbated by subsidy.
Introduction
The advent of modern risk management in agriculture is increasingly becoming focused on whole farm income insurance. By whole farm income insurance it is meant that a single policy is provided which covers the covariate risk of jointly produced farm crop and livestock enterprises. It is a separate and distinct approach to those farm safety nets that focus on crop specific insurance, price insurance and stabilization, or enterprise revenue insurance.
Explorations into income insurance in Canada and the United States have been conducted by Turvey and Amanor-Boadu 1989; Hennessy, Babcock Hayes 1997, and Hennessy, Saak and Babcock (2003) and in a European context by Meuwissen, Huirne, and Skees (2003) but none, for a variety of reasons, are satisfactory from an economic point of view. The most serious deficiency, and that which is most explored in this paper, is the endogeneity of the insurance decision on crop choices. An exception is discussion of whole farm income insurance in the United States discussed in a very thorough review by Dismukes and Durst (2006) . There they recommend a whole farm approach that does not require savings account balances such as Canada's CAIS program or income insurance savings in Australia but rather a whole farm approach that is based on portfolio indemnities and premiums. This is along the lines of the AGR and AGR-Lite programs in the United States which they describe as whole farm revenue insurance.
Nonetheless there has been scant research done on either the design of whole farm income insurance, how income insurance would affect enterprise selection, the effect of subsidy on crop choices, or the impact income insurance might have in terms of decoupling and World Trade Organization guidelines. With these problems in mind, the purpose of this paper is to investigate farm portfolio choice under whole farm income insurance plans. The particular plans include a gross revenue plan as a point of comparison, but the real focus is on a generalized indemnity-based whole farm plan stylized to the AGR program in the United States and the CAIS and AgrInvest policies in Canada. Canadian data is used for a typical farm in Manitoba.
The next section is focused on policy design and model specification. This is followed by a discussion of the data sources, Monte Carlo simulations, and optimization results and conclusions.
Perhaps one of the most important outcome of this paper is a better understanding of endogenous choice in portfolio selection under a whole farm insurance regime. This is of course the fundamental problem facing policy makers and the consequence of choice have far reaching implications into matters of trade, market distortions, wealth accumulation, asset capitalization and so on. Yet our understanding to date is quite rudimentary. For example the portfolio models of Turvey and Amanor-Boadu (1989) or Hennessy, Saak and Babcock (2003) take the crop mix as exogenous. The notion that farmers will incorporate the parameters of insurance (allowable coverage and premium subsidy) into their crop planning strategy which in turn will simultaneously affect the cost of insurance and benefits of subsidy is not a trivial one, especially in the context of decoupling and the WTO (Baffes and de Gorter, 2004) . The key factor is that the rules for eligibility and the criteria upon which payments are based upon originally (like the volume of production or use of input or status of a farmer) cannot change once the decoupled program is set in place (Baffes and de Gorter 2004) 1 . Care is required. At one level it would appear that if farmers paid fully an actuarial price, a production response would be decoupled because neither the policy or its benefits is targeted to any particular crop. Where the problem comes about is when tax payer funds are used to subsidize the insurance. If premiums are subsidized there will be an income effect that could favour the inclusion of crops in the final farm portfolio that would not have ordinarily been considered, even though the policy was not targeted to the favored crops. Examining how whole farm income insurance can affect farm enterprise selection is therefore important not only in the context of agricultural economics but in the practical matters of agricultural policy and trade.
A second problem this paper resolves is in modeling the complexity of whole farm income insurance. The problem of modeling whole farm income with endogenous premium determination has not to the writer's knowledge been solved previously. In this paper we show how to structure a mathematical programming model to account for this complexity. The third 1 We will leave aside in this paper the implications of decoupled programs and government payments in general on other possible distortions such as land values. These effects are discussed elsewhere in Weersink et al, (1999) ; Goodwin et al (2003) ; However it is easy to understand how the expected wealth effect of subsidy can affect land values. Looking ahead to Table 7 the expected indemnity for Income insurance with a $185,000 target and a 50% subsidy implies an expected gain in wealth of $19,219 . Spread over 1,000 acres the simple capitalized value of $19.219/acre at 10% implies a land benefit of $192.19/acre.
problem we contribute to is related to the second and that deals specifically with how to price whole farm insurance. First we must distinguish whole farm insurance from say crop-specific gross revenue assurance applied to all crops in a portfolio because it explicitly includes crossenterprise covariances and other dependencies (such as crop rotations).
A fourth problem arises in terms of expected utility. The concern here is that not all farmers will behave alike. Differing degrees of risk aversion or varying preference for reduced risk or positive skewness can affect crop decisions under a whole farm insurance plan. In this paper farm plans are optimized under the insurance policies using both a variance minimizing objective and a skewness maximizing objective. These models correspond to second degree stochastic dominance (see Hader and Russel 1969; Ogryczak and Ruszczynski 2001) and third degree stochastic dominance respectively (see Whitemore 1970 and Levy 1992) . We rely on a theorem by Gotoh and Konno (2000) who show that an optimization model that maximizes the third moment of the probability distribution is also third degree stochastic dominant. This is of particular relevance for problems in risk management in which derivative products or insurance either skew probabilities towards more favourable outcomes, or truncate the lower partial moments entirely. This paper therefore explores the problem of income insurance with both a quasi mean variance approach (in the sense that multivariate normality is not imposed) that minimizes portfolio risk, and a mean skewness model that maximizes the skewness of the resulting portfolio. We are unaware of any other study that has actually maximized skewness in a portfolio problem as we do here. We find the solutions strikingly different and conclude that when it comes to incorporating risk contingencies in a portfolio model, mean variance cannot be assumed as a matter of course.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss expected utility and rationalize our use of mean-Variance (E-V) and mean-Skewness (E-S) optimizations. This is followed with mathematical descriptions of the income insurance and gross revenue insurance models. The data sources and use of Monte Carlo simulation of state-space is then provided, and the results of the models and conclusions follow.
Whole Farm Income, Expected Utility and Stochastic Dominance
The use of stochastic dominance to investigate agricultural crop insurance decisions is not foreign to the literature (Wilson et al 2009) 
This also represents a much broader spectrum of utility in which risk aversion can be decreasing, constant or increasing in π , but more generally it is assumed that ( )
decreasing absolute risk aversion. (1) holds surely for negative exponential utility and weakly for power or logarithmic utility (Krause and Litzenberg 1976; Bawa 1975) . It has also been suggested that ( )
U π ≥ implies a preference for positive skewness but how general this conclusion is has been questioned by Brockett and Kahane (1992) . Nonetheless, the link between ( ) ''' 0 U π ≥ and skewness identified by Arditti (1967) and Tsiang (1972) , experimentally by Alderfer and Bierman (1970) and empirically by Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) appears to be consistent with observed behavior, that is a preference for higher return ( ( ) ' 0 U π ≥ ), and aversion to variance ( ( ) '' 0 U π ≤ ) and a preference for skewness ( ( )
The general belief is that the three elements of (1) are not mutually exclusive; that it is normally assumed that the utility maximizer prefers more income to less AND prefers less variance to more AND prefers more skewness to less (or equivalently a smaller lower partial moment OR a larger higher partial moment). These combine to establish the necessary conditions for the ordering of risky prospects, and we label them accordingly: A manager who ignores risk and skewness is labeled as risk neutral; one who ignores skewness is a risk minimizer; one who includes all is a skewness maximizer. The precedence matters in the general expected utility model, for we would not ordinarily consider a preference for positive skewness if positive skewness comes at the expense of higher variance. This can be problematic for not all classes of probability distributions can preserve the ordering of mean and variance while altering skewness. The surgical removal of probabilities from the central core of the probability distribution and transplantation to the tails by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) and Kroll and Levy (1988) is illustrative of these complexities. Alternatively the SSD rule from Porter (1974) claims that among prospects with equal means a prospect with higher left-distribution semivariance will be least preferred as a necessary but not sufficient condition. It is not sufficient because it is entirely possible that the same distribution could be preferred if, for example, when measured relative to a target the right-distribution semivariance is considerably higher (see also Levy 1992 ).
More formally we are considering the class of third degree stochastic dominant solutions which minimally contain all orderings of first and second degree stochastic dominance in the set.
By the general proofs of stochastic dominance (see for example Hadar and Russel (1971) , Whitemore (1970) , and Gotoh and Kanno (2000) ) orderings that are second order stochastic dominant are also third order stochastic dominant, but not all third degree stochastic dominant orderings are second degree stochastic dominant. On this basis theorem 5.2 of Gotoh and Kanno shows that the third order moment
has a solution that is TSD semi-efficient (that is, when evaluated at equivalent target income 
in the optimization models to be presented below, the solutions are TSD efficient if the variance of the first is less than or equal to the variance of the second 2 . This rule has been established by Whitmore (1970) as being necessary but not sufficient. In our model we do not impose the constraint ( ) ( )
because as a tautology it would place an unnecessary restriction on the upper bound of the positively skewed distribution we seek. By tautology we mean that having already established the minimum variance frontier the imposition of the constraint would do no more than ensure that the E-S skewness frontier lies on all points along the E-V frontier.
Rather, it is far more interesting to optimize without the constraint and check to determine whether ( ) ( ) But what of the current choices that farmers face between the mutually exclusive options of operating a farm without income insurance, or participating in an income insurance program?
To start define ( ) f π as the probability distribution of farm portfolio profit without participation in income insurance and ( ) 
where Z is an insurance coverage level and θ is the probability of receiving an insurance ) captures the fact that the distribution function shifts to the right when the premium is less than actuarially fair. If an administrative load is added so that 1 u δ ≥ > then (7) fails and the insurance policy will not dominate the base case by FSD. Of course in many industries an administrative load is added and insurance is still purchased because insurance reduces or eliminates the lower partial moments below base coverage. Thus 1 0 δ ≥ ≥ is a necessary but not sufficient condition for SSD. The SSD claim is generally interpreted in terms of portfolio variance. We proceed accordingly. The variance without insurance is (10) does not hold. Generally we can assume that the public provision of agricultural insurance will be priced so that (9) holds to be true in most if not all instances. We can also see the insufficiency of the condition 1 0 δ ≥ ≥ ; There will be some range, (10) is true but for which (7) is false. That is, portfolio variance will be less than the base case while the expected profits are also less than the base case. Thus one cannot say that in all cases income insurance will dominate the base case by SSD as a matter of course, but as suggested above, the current policy regime of subsidized income insurance suggests that beyond the theoretical world whole farm income insurance will be preferred to no insurance.
With truncated (or significantly reduced) variance and expected profits equal to or better than the base case there will be a natural increase in the skewness of ( ) f x . This is most often represented by the distribution of the third moment. For the base case this is
and with agricultural insurance (assuming for simplicity that 1
Assuming that 0 Z π μ − ≤ (that is portfolio coverage is less than or equal to the mean) the reduction in
Thus for any Z a > the resulting distribution of ( ) g x will always be more positively skewed than ( ) f π . With lower variance (Eq 10) and higher expected income (Eq 7) almost certain to be true with the public provision of income insurance, we can conclude with reasonable (but not perfect) certainty that the necessary conditions for whole farm insurance to dominate the base case by TSD will be satisfied. Importantly, since we have imposed no restrictions on the distribution of ( ) f π then TSD dominance will hold for virtually any probability distribution that is continuous and locally differentiable or approximately so. This leads to the problem of endogeneity discussed in the introduction. It is understood that the distribution of profits is conditional on the choice and weighting of crops grown and this will impact both the range of indemnity and the cost of insurance. It is entirely feasible that the dominance of the insured distribution over the uninsured distribution will encourage some farmers to maximize skewness even if that comes at an increase in downside risk and insurance premium.
Optimization Models for Whole Farm Insurance
This study uses two variants of the mean-variance and mean-skewness models. The first model is used to optimize a base case with no insurance as well as the enterprise specific gross revenue insurance. The second is a more complex model that shows the normative response to whole farm insurance policies in Canada (CAIS and AgrInvest) and the U.S. (AGR). Here the payout is based on the choice of ALL crops rather than on individual crops.
The base Model
As a point of comparison the base model excludes all forms of insurance. The objective function is to minimize portfolio risk across all states of nature using a discrete state-spaced framework. This is distinctively different from the quadratic programming approach used by
Turvey and Amanor-Boadu that requires the full specification of a positive-definite variance covariance matrix as the objective function. The use of state-spaced programming is required because later, when we build the gross revenue and whole farm models, the payouts are contingent on the particular states that emerge and not on the means. Furthermore it is assumed that only revenue is uncertain, and although the revenue states, R, represent gross margins, the cost structure is deterministic. The base E-V model is as follows:
[ ] 
Gross Revenue Insurance
Because of the historical interest in gross revenue insurance we also build an optimization model to investigate it. In this model all crops have available a gross revenue option. Although each of the revenue states are identical to the base model, any shortfalls receive payments. Because premiums are marginal each state of nature is net of variable costs, state contingent indemnities, crop specific revenue insurance premiums and subsidy.
⎦ is the crop specific revenue indemnity for state j and 1, ,
Whole Farm Income Insurance and the AGR Model
The whole farm insurance model is more complex. The first whole farm model is a straight forward portfolio insurance policy that closely resembles the AGR program in the United States. The program provides an indemnity if farm income from all sources falls below a pre-specified coverage level. The indemnity, which is priced to be actuarially sound, is equal to the expected value of the indemnities across all states of nature. In comparison with the enterprise specific models described above and in which portfolio choice is based on insurance outcomes known prior to selecting a crop mix, the whole farm approach requires first the selection of the crop mix and only then can whole farm insurance premiums be calculated and indemnities enumerated. In other words the payouts and premiums are endogenous to the optimization problem, whereas with the enterprise approach the payouts and premiums are exogenous. The whole farm model is structured as follows:
All notation corresponds to the revenue insurance model described above, except here we include Z, which represents the income coverage level to be protected by income insurance.
Then,
represents the whole farm indemnity payout in any given state of nature and
is the premium to be paid given loading factor δ . If 1 δ = the whole farm insurance premium is actuarially fair. If 0.50 δ = the premium is subsidized by 50%..
The Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization Program (CAIS)
The The CAIS program is a whole farm insurance program which differs only in the measurement of payouts and in the premium setting. It is whole farm insurance in the sense that all eligible farm enterprises are included in the mix, and payouts are based on the income as a whole. This is in comparison to GRIP type programs which provide insurance on its parts. CAIS pays out on accrued income (after adjustments for inventory, receivables and payables) and is defined by a margin equal to the accrued difference between revenues and eligible expenses.
Ineligible expenses include capital costs, depreciation, wages, salaries and so on.
CAIS is a three-tiered program to protect against income losses below a targeted margin.
The targeted margin is normally the average margin over the past 5 years although in the present formulation the margin is based upon current market risks on a mark-to-market basis. The three tiers are mathematically defined as follows: 
In words, if income falls to within 85% of the elected margin the farmer will receive 50% of the shortfall in tier 1. If the margin is below 85% of the elected margin but above 70%, then tier 2 indemnities pay 70% of the shortfall, and if the margin is less than 70% of the shortfall then the farmer will receive an indemnity of 80% of the shortfall. In other words, the more severe is the loss the greater weight is put on the indemnity. The final indemnity is equal to the sum of the three tiered payouts, but the total payout cannot exceed 65% of the total shortfall below the elected margin.
The actual legislated premium assigned to CAIS is not actuarially sound. In actuality it is defined as 0.85 $55 1, 000
In other words the legislated premium is tied to the target income and not the underlying risk. In addition to evaluating portfolio choice with this premium I also investigate portfolio choice if premiums are actuarially sound and subsidized at 50% of the actuarial rate.
The Canadian AgrInvest Policy
The 2008 program is to some extent similar to the CAIS program but differs in several respects. First, there is no tier 1 payout under the new program. Instead, under AgrInvest, farmers can set aside 1.5% of eligible sales into a savings account and this will be matched by the Government. Under AgriStability tier 2 and tier 3 payouts are combined such that any shortfall below 85% of margin will be indemnified up to 70% and any negative shortfall would be indemnified to 65%. Finally AgrInsure provides for multiple peril crop insurance so that crop insurance payouts can be received even if final margins exceed the target margin, but are added to the margin in the event of a whole farm loss to decrease AgriStability payouts. Mathematically we have: is a crop insurance payout but not an AgriStability payout, however in this paper we exclude AgrInsure (the optional addition of crop insurance) to focus exclusively on the whole farm income component. Note that we do not exclude AgrInvest as a passive benefit. Even though the amount invested is contingent on the gross revenue item it is still a benefit tied to production and production decisions. It is entirely possible that a variable (random) payout on revenues is not neutral and needs to be investigated separately. This is especially true if money is considered fungible between savings and investment.
The critical element with the AgrInvest program is the cost to farmers. In essence, for the maximum coverage farmers will pay $4.50 per $1,000 of margin plus a $55 administrative fee.
For example a margin of $100,000 will cost the farmer only $450 plus $55 = $505, which is extraordinarily low for the insurable and investment benefit. (Crop insurance under AgrInsure is sold as a separate risk management product.)
Optimizing the CAIS and AgrInvest programs are however, a simple modification of the model presented above. representing the actuarial value of the cost and δ represents a discount or subsidy.
Rotational Constraints
In addition to the land and income constraints identified in the models constraints were also imposed on production. Crop rotational constraints in Manitoba are designed to mitigate the emergence of plant diseases. For Manitoba the constraints are a) canola acres can be no more than 250 acres and no less than 200 acres; b) flaxseed acres can be no greater than canola acres; c) the total of field peas plus lentil acres must equal canola acres; and d) acres planted to hard red wheat must exceed acres planted to durum wheat. No constraints were imposed on barley beyond the marginal effects of the explicit constraints. Varying target income levels (e.g. $175,000) results in different farm portfolios with different risk profiles. Ultimately we seek to understand
how and to what extent the various agricultural risk management policies could affect portfolio choices and management practices.
Data and Assumptions
The representative farm models for Manitoba requires data from multiple sources. Agriculture;). In all cases crop yields were based on provincial averages which were tested using Palisades's Best Fit computer program. Despite findings of non-normality in some studies the assumption of normality as an approximation to any of the crop yields could not be ruled out and so for convenience, and with no loss in generality, we assumed normally distributed yields for all crops. Crop yields represent provincial averages, and while the averages are consistent with actual individual farm yields, the standard deviations were not. A study by the author showed that on average individual farm yields ranged from about 66% to 125% higher than an 'average' yield metric. Hence, while keeping mean yields at their historical provincial average all standard deviations were increased by 75% 5 .The data are reported in Table 1 .
Costs of production (Tables 1) were obtained from cost of production and enterprise budgets prepared by the agricultural ministry in Manitoba and are based on an acre basis. Price and yield correlations used are reported in Table 2 . The costs of Gross Revenue Insurance were obtained using Monte Carlo simulation. These are reported in Table 3 and are based on 20,000
Monte Carlo replications to ensure convergence under the law of large numbers. In the optimization models that follow, only the first 1,000 Monte Carlo iterations were used. Every
Monte Carlo simulation used the same initial seed so that the all models can be compared directly. 
Results
We will discuss the results in two steps. First we will use tables 4 and 5 to discuss the crop plans and illustrate how different assumptions about farmer behaviour (risk aversion, skewness preference) and differing attributes in policy design can affect crop choices. The tables themselves obscure some interesting results one of which is the relationship between skewness preference and indemnity. We then discuss more broadly the various relationships between risk and return and dominance in the context of the E-V and E-S models as well as expected utility maximization. Table 4 with unsubsidized GRIP and $38,739 when subsidized. Likewise, AgrInvest has skewness of 1.23 with a range of $11,080 to $498,276 when unsubsidized, 1.347 with a range of $25,551 to $475,666 when subsidized by 50% and skewness of 1.518 with a range from $38,070 to $451,224 when subsidized at the legislated rate. In general, subsidy increases the skewness of the distribution while increasing the lower bound loss. Note that Income Insurance has the highest minimum value. Income insurance is the only policy that truly truncates the risk at the 80% coverage level. The three-tiered design of CAIS and AgriInvest allows some slippage of downside risk. Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution functions for whole farm income insurance and GRIP, and illustrates the relationship between risk reduction and premium subsidization.
There are several explanations for these results. The first is when the objective is to satisfy a target income, that is a solution constrained by money rather than risk aversion, the insurance offsets risk to some degree. On an actuarial basis the mean return with and without insurance are the same, but the reallocation of risk permits a different solution. The reduction in variance shifts lower moments to higher moments with a concomitant increase in expected income, but this shift is offset exactly by the actuarial premium. When the premium is subsidized the income effect plays a more dominant role. In order to achieve the stated income the farmer can balance insurance payouts against natural risk, but with the subsidy the degree of risk will be lower. On the basis of higher risk-higher return a risk-free addition to expected income requires that less risk be taken in order to achieve the target. In contrast there are more opportunities to exploit risk at the margin with GRIP type programs. That is the tradeoff between enterprise risk is stronger with the income effect higher for higher risk crops rather than averaged across all crops. Table 5 provides the solutions for the skewness model 7 . As expected an objective that maximizes skewness results in solutions that are quite different from those in Table 4 that minimize risk 8 . 7 The reader might be interested in the minimize skewness option. Using the base model for $155,000 we get example Eq 2). Our skewness model did not impose this restriction. However, for completeness we ran several optimizations on the base model that included the restriction in the skewness model. No interior solution resulted that would have confirmed a dominant TSD solution. Imposing the constraint resulted in solutions identical to the base E-V solutions, which is no more than a confirmation that all SSD solutions are part of the TSD set. Likewise for the whole farm insurance models. The E-S models with standard deviation constrained was identical to the E-V solution. . These relationships are typical of all E-V and E-S comparisons. The E-S frontier lies everywhere below the E-V frontier, except at the maximum and minimum feasible solutions at which they are equal. Because the E-S frontier lies below the E-V frontier portfolio standard deviations are higher, which indicates that the necessary conditions for the skewness maximization model to dominate the mean variance model by TSD is not satisfied. Because the condition is not sufficient we cannot conclude that the E-S solutions between the minimum and maximum feasible solutions either dominate or do not dominate the E-V solutions by TSD. What is clear is that in order to optimize positive skewness and hence a higher potential gain in the upper partial moments, decision makers will have to accept considerably greater risk. However, because downside risk is reduced or truncated with insurance a source if increased variability can be attributed to the spread between the higher upper bound of the income distribution that comes with skewness preference. Thus, although portfolio standard deviation is higher this does not necessarily imply that the incremental variability is undesirable. What is evident is that comparisons across models do satisfy the necessary conditions. Thus we can state that E-S portfolios under GRIP or WFI dominate the base model by TSD and that WFI dominates GRIP by TSD but we cannot conclude that E-S decisions for GRIP (as an example) dominates E-V decisions by TSD.
E-V and E-S Efficiency

Constant Absolute Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Maximization
In the discussion above we observed that in order to meet a fixed target under the E-V rule farmers will select lower risk portfolios. How this translates into an expected utility framework is discussed in this section. We do this with a simple modification of the objective function by substituting the standard utility maximization objective with (truncated) standard deviation $79,520 with the 50% subsidy applied. In all cases the expected utility model with insurance yielded solutions that were higher on the base E-V frontier (i.e higher risk and higher income) than the base solution of $145,000 with equivalent risk aversion. Furthermore the riskiness of the portfolios got larger as the subsidy increased. This leads us to conclude that agricultural insurance, in general, inhibits risk aversion and encourages farmers to take production risks that would not ordinarily be taken in the absence of insurance.
Portfolio Choice and Expected Indemnity
Tables 4 and 5 also provide the expected indemnities premiums for the income insurance models when the insurance is charged an actuarial rate, subsidized by 50% and in the cases of CAIS and AgrInvest the much lower legislated rate (between approximately $600 and $900 total). These are illustrated in Figure 5 The table confirms the various propositions discussed. First, farmers will respond to the premium structure. The greater the subsidy the greater will be the willingness of farmers to accept strategies with lower downside risk and hence will receive higher expected indemnities 10 .
For example under the EV strategy for CAIS at a target income of $145,000 the expected indemnities are $25,897 when the farmer pays the actuarial premium, $29,446 when the premium is subsidized by 50% and $37,744 when the much lower legislated premium is charged.
Second, as target income increases so does the expected indemnity. This is an expected result since higher income implies greater risk. For example under AgrInvest with the actuarial rate the EV solution shows expected indemnities increasing from $22,876 to $28,842 as target income increases from $125,000 to $165,000. Third, at equivalent income levels farmers with skewness preference will tend towards solutions that have higher downside risk. But examining Table 5 this is a tendency and not a generality. Indeed, at least two feasible solutions, that with the lowest feasible expected income and that with the highest will result in exact solutions for either risk 10 Maximizing skewness does not necessarily mean the same as maximizing the indemnity, although they are closely related. Altering the model to maximize indemnity payouts alters the farm plan. In general maximizing indemnity increases the standard deviation and decreases skewness. In other words, one cannot make the claim that maximizing skewness is the same as maximizing indemnity. For example with a 50% subsidy maximizing indemnity with a target income of $155,000 results in an expected payout of $37,996 compared to $37,090 for the E-S solution, but skewness is lower (1.844 vs. 1.861) and portfolio standard deviation is higher ($74,236 vs. $73,610) . Across all target income levels alternative strategies could be implemented to increase indemnities by as much as 9.3% (for $135,000) with an increase in standard deviation of 4.7% and a decrease in skewness of 1.14%. Under rational assumptions of expected utility maximizations one could dismiss the idea of indemnity maximization, but in more practical terms indemnity maximization could be a feasible strategy for non utility maximizers. Of additional interest is the discovery that solutions based on the 3 σ measure provide solutions identical to the indemnity maximization models for WFI. The reasoning behind the differences, we conjecture, is that the skewness measure moderates 3 σ by the standard deviation. For the base model using 3 σ rather than skewness resulted in identical strategies.
minimizers or skewness maximizers. The interesting results are with the GRIP solution. In all cases, the lower income of the skewness portfolio is significantly higher than the E-V portfolio.
With a 50% subsidy and a target of $145,000 the lowest income outcome under E-V is $38,739 but for the skewness portfolio it is $56,778. This is a differentiating characteristic of commodity specific programs which are better able to target risk management in terms of marginal risk reduction rather than the portfolio approach which targets risk management to the portfolio average. Portfolio Income
Mean Indemnities (E-V)
Expected Indemnity
AgrInvest 100% E-V AgrInvest 50% AgrInvest Legislated WFI 100% WFI 50% GRIP 100% GRIP 50% Figure 5 Expected Indemnities for E-V Solutions. The figure shows the level of indemnities for E-V solutions on AgrInvest, Whole Farm Income (WFI) and GRIP. WFI at 50% and AgrInvest at the legislated premium correspond with the higher expected indemnity. For AgrInvest and WFI expected indemnities increase with subsidy which strongly suggests that an unintended consequence of subsidy is that farmers will select lower income strategies and rely on subsidy to meat target income. This is not the case for GRIP which shows that an increased subsidy actually lowers expected payouts.
Discussion, Conclusions, and Policy Recommendations
This paper has investigated the effects of whole farm income insurance on farm portfolio choice. A representative Manitoba farm model was used for crops grown, prices received, inputs purchased, and growing conditions including crop rotational constraints. The main problem addressed in this study was to determine how safety net programs such as GRIP, Income
Insurance, CAIS and AgrInvest affected crop choices. To do these two mathematical programming models were employed. The first is a mean variance model in which the objective is to minimize risk, while the second was developed to maximize skewness. There are two novel contributions here. First, the optimization models endogenized the insurance choice. That is, if farmers know the parameters of the whole farm insurance policy then it is possible that they would alter their management practices to optimize the insurance decision. Hence the model employed simultaneously solved for the insurance premium and crop choice. The second is the use of a mean-skewness model. It was shown that a utility maximizer with a strong preference for skewness would optimize differently than one who minimizes risk. By maximizing skewness the farmer would seek strategies that would cluster outcomes to the upside even if this meant more variance (albeit truncated or non symmetric) or accepting a greater downside risk, but in fewer states.
The results provide justification for some concerns raised about the neutrality of these programs in the context of decoupling. When unsubsidized, Income insurance, CAIS and AgrInvest provide identical solutions to the uninsured strategy. It is the incremental response to subsidy that creates the wealth effect that may impact or distort markets. Whether whole farm income policies are amber is debatable. On the one hand because there is no specificity in the programs, that is one crop is not specifically targeted over another, whole farm programs are seemingly decoupled. The fact that farmers with different degrees of risk aversion, as indicated by the election of low versus high target incomes, or with varying degrees of variance minimizing or skewness preference would optimize differently, bolsters this argument. On the other hand if farmers are generally homogenous in their attitudes towards risk, then many farmers optimizing according to the same rules may give the appearance of coupling and thus provide cause for a complaint under WTO.
On a more pragmatic level the methods employed in the study may too provide some benefits. The existing AgrInvest program uses the past five years of production history and tax filer information to establish margin. The data simulation in this paper applied Monte Carlo simulations to correlated prices and yields with prices modeled as a random walk and yields assumed normal. The idea of using a random walk is a departure from the historical 5-year performance stated in the legislation. Nonetheless the use of mark-to-market prices in the simulation ensures that whatever the portfolio outcomes they are based on current price paths and risk and are not distorted by historical precedent.
